Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia
by Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick; Strategic Studies Institute
8:00 a.m. January 15, 2003 PDT
The following is excerpted from an extensive paper provided by the Strategic Studies Institute
. The full .pdf document (193 kb) may be downloaded here
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government or the e11th hour editorial staff. This project was completed under the auspices of the Strategic Studies Institute's External Research Associates Program.
There is a danger that U.S. policy toward Central Asia may prove counterproductive: to defend the peace against terrorism, the United States has ended up cooperating with the very tyrants responsible for the repression that increases support for home-grown anti-government and transnational movements.
As Secretary of State Colin Powell told the House International Relations Committee in February 2002, the United States "will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind that we could not have dreamed of before." After providing background on the development of U.S. security interests in Central Asia, this monograph examines post-9/11 trends in U.S. policy and military engagement.
In the 1990s the United States initiated military engagement with Central Asia to support the region's integration with western political-military institutions, as well as to protect the sovereignty and independence of these states, assist them to improve their border security against transnational threats, encourage them to adopt market-oriented reform and democratization, and ensure access to energy resources in the region. U.S. military cooperation expanded rapidly with Central Asian states in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 due to the framework of relations that had been built piecemeal in the 1990s. For the first time the United States acquired temporary basing in this region in response to a changing security environment, as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan became frontline states in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Anti-terrorism became the central focus of U.S. policy in the region, although other goals still remain important.
The author argues that by placing a priority on anti-terrorism in U.S. policy toward Central Asia and rewarding Central Asian leaders for basing rights, the Bush administration is shoring up authoritarian regimes and encouraging public distrust of U.S. intentions in the region. She points out that weak regional security organizations, contingent support in Russia and China to the expanding American military foothold in the region, and instability in Central Asia will pose considerable challenges for the U.S. military. In conclusion, the author recommends an emphasis on rapid deployment from existing bases in Turkey rather than continued basing in Central Asia, a more coherent regional strategy and improved foreign area expertise for the Central Asian region, and a multilateral approach to addressing instability in the area.. . . . .
N THE 1990s
the United States initiated military engagement with Central Asia to support the region's integration with western political-military institutions, as well as to protect the sovereignty and independence of these states, assist them to improve their border security against transnational threats, encourage them to adopt market-oriented reform and democratization, and ensure access to energy resources in the region. After 9/11, for the first time the United States acquired temporary basing in this region in response to a changing security environment, as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan became frontline states in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Anti-terrorism has become the central focus of U.S. policy in the region, although other goals still remain important. As Secretary of State Colin Powell told the House International Relations Committee, the United States "will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind that we could not have dreamed of before."[1
Prior to 9/11, Central Asia had been relatively marginal to U.S. national security, but since then the region has assumed a new importance as U.S. policymakers have used the lessons of ENDURING FREEDOM to refashion the American national security framework and revise long-standing concepts of deterrence to address new threats from international terrorism. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted that the war in Afghanistan shows that the United States is prepared to take preemptive action against states sponsoring terrorism.[2
] Although as a presidential candidate George W. Bush had criticized President William Clinton for turning the United States into "the world's policeman," the Bush administration is currently revising the United States national security strategy to support preemptive action against terrorists and the countries that support them.[3
In a June 1, 2002, address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Bush outlined what he termed the "three silos" of his foreign policy: defending the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants; preserving the peace by building good relations among great powers; and extending the peace by encouraging free and open societies.[4
] This policy, as applied to Central Asia since 9/11, has proven to embrace mutually contradictory goals. By placing a priority on anti-terrorism in U.S. policy toward Central Asia and rewarding Central Asian leaders for basing rights, the Bush administration is shoring up authoritarian regimes and encouraging public distrust of U.S. intentions in the region. Although Russia, and to a lesser extent, China have cooperated with the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, their support is not unqualified and could easily dissipate in the event the United States decides to maintain a long-term military presence in Central Asia or expand the war on terrorism in a major ground attack against Iraq.
After providing background on the development of U.S. security interests in Central Asia, this monograph examines post-9/11 trends in U.S. policy and military engagement.
The monograph points out that weak regional security organizations, contingent support in Russia and China to the expanding American military foothold in the region, and instability in Central Asia will pose considerable challenges for the United States military. In conclusion, the monograph recommends an emphasis on rapid deployment from existing bases in Turkey rather than continued basing in Central Asia, a more coherent regional strategy and improved foreign area expertise for the Central Asian region, and a multilateral approach to addressing instability in the area.The Development of U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia
U.S. military cooperation with Central Asian states expanded rapidly in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 due to the framework of relations that had been built piecemeal in the 1990s. After recognizing the newly independent Central Asian states in late 1991, the United States developed diplomatic relations with them in an effort to support democratization and responsible security policies, and provide a counterweight to the expansion of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence.[5
] With the passage of the Freedom Support Act on October 24, 1992, the United States laid the foundation for multifaceted assistance to the Central Asian states, initially focusing on democratization and the promotion of free market economies. Security cooperation increasingly would play an important role in U.S. relations with these states because of the important U.S. security interest in eliminating nuclear weapons based in Kazakhstan and in preventing proliferation in the region.
Consequently, Kazakhstan was the initial focus of U.S. security cooperation in Central Asia. In December 1993, Vice-President Al Gore and Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a cooperative threat reduction (CTR) agreement to dismantle and destroy the 104 SS-18 missiles and silos in Kazakhstan. The following year, U.S.-Kazakhstan security cooperation became institutionalized in a joint commission.[6
] By mid-1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, had joined NATO's partnership for peace program (PfP), and officers from these states, plus Tajikistan, began participating in PfP exercises as of 1995.[7
] The inclusion of the Central Asian states in the PfP program formalized their relations with NATO, provided a mechanism for regional security cooperation, and established a basis for combined action. According to Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, expanding military-to-military cooperation would help reduce regional instability and promote mutual security in an effort to avoid any replay of the 19th Century Great Game with its zero-sum competition for influence among great powers.[8
Due to concern about the threat of proliferation of nuclear materials from Kazakhstan, since 1994 the United States has been assisting the country to shut down the Aktau fast breeder reactor and remove nuclear materials. In recognition of the geopolitical importance of Uzbekistan in the struggle to eliminate Osama Bin Laden's terrorist network, a U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Commission was formed in February 1998.[9
] In 1999, the United States and Uzbekistan signed a CTR agreement to dismantle and decontaminate a biological weapons research facility and to provide alternative employment for its scientists. Uzbekistan's importance to U.S. nonproliferation efforts was highlighted in March 2000, when Uzbekistan used American detectors to intercept radioactive materials from Kazakhstan destined for the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.[10
In March 17, 1999, testimony to Congress, former NIS Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich summed up the Clinton administration's policy toward Central Asia as pursuing four interrelated goals: (1) democratization;(2) market-oriented reform; (3) greater integration with western political and military institutions; and (4) responsible security policies on nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and drug trafficking. Sestanovich noted that securing the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Central Asian states was the cornerstone of U.S. policy.[11
The Clinton administration's national security strategy elaborated on the security interests underpinning U.S. policy toward Central Asia. These included establishing the rule of law in an effort to combat crime and corruption, creating a stable environment for energy exports (as a part of a broader U.S. interest in diversifying energy supplies), reducing regional threats (nonproliferation, terrorism), and developing regional cooperation to encourage the Central Asian states to support one another in the event of instability or threats to peace.[12
Congress reaffirmed the United States commitment to military engagement with Central Asia with the passage on March 10, 1999, of the Silk Road Strategy Act, which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to support the economic and political independence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus and promote regional reconciliation, cooperation, and economic development. The new legislation provided for border control assistance to facilitate interdiction of drug trafficking, nonproliferation, and transnational criminal activities, as well as for humanitarian assistance to victims of conflicts in the region, and assistance for the development of free market economies and associated infrastructure.[13
] Anti-terrorism became a more explicit component of U.S. policy toward Central Asia in the aftermath of armed incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999.
In April 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced a new Central Asian Border Security Initiative (CASI), which provided $3 million in additional security assistance to each of the Central Asian states, initially to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, and later to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan as well. After further IMU attacks in Uzbekistan in August 2000, during which several Americans were held hostage, the State Department included the IMU, linked to Osama bin Laden, in its list of foreign terrorist organizations in September 2000.[14
] In its initial year in office, the Bush administration maintained the core components of the Clinton policy toward Central Asia (regional security, political and economic reform), while further accentuating the importance of energy development.[15
Yet, at the same time as Central Asia's importance increased for energy development and counterterrorism efforts, by the end of the decade, U.S. policymakers, especially in Congress,[16
] became increasingly disappointed by the lack of progress toward democratization, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, and by Uzbekistan's continuing deplorable human rights record.
Post-9/11 Policy Shifts
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, anti-terrorism became the defining principle of U.S. foreign policy, resulting in a major reshuffling of Washington's foreign relations.[17
] On the 6-month anniversary of the attacks, Bush stated that the United States response depended on the "critical support" of countries such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan, a remarkable turnaround considering that up until September 11 sanctions had been imposed on Pakistan (and India) due to their 1998 nuclear tests and Uzbekistan had been criticized sharply for its poor human rights record.[18
In Central Asia the change in U.S. priorities was felt immediately, as Uzbekistan, in particular, and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan suddenly became frontline states in the U.S.-led struggle against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network. Top U.S. officials streamed through Central Asian capitals. Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov and Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev both held summit meetings with President Bush.
In testimony to a newly created Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Central Asia and the Caucasus (its formation in itself a testament to the increasing importance of the region for U.S. foreign policy), Assistant Secretary of State A. Elizabeth Jones hailed the important role the Central Asian states played in providing a corridor for shipments of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and in supporting coalition anti-terrorism efforts. She outlined three sets of long-term interests the United States would continue to pursue in the region: (1) preventing the spread of terrorism; (2) assisting the Central Asian states with economic and political reform and the rule of law, and (3) ensuring the security and transparent development of Caspian energy resources.[19
Central Asian states, which had received a relatively small share of U.S. assistance funds for the former Soviet Union, saw their support increased across the board due to emergency supplemental appropriations to facilitate their participation in anti-terrorism activities. In 2001, Uzbekistan gained the most from the additional funding, receiving an extra $25 million in foreign military financing (FMF), $18 million in nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs (NADR), and $40.5 million in Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds. Despite the new American largesse with respect to Uzbekistan, the Senate succeeded in including an amendment to the Foreign Appropriations Act on October 24, 2001, requiring the State Department to report to Congress every 6 months on Uzbekistan's use of U.S. military assistance and human rights violations.[20
The war against terrorism also led to a fundamental change in U.S. policy toward Azerbaijan, which received an additional $3 million in NADR funding in FY 2001. In an effort to facilitate military cooperation with that country, the Senate amended U.S. legislation prohibiting any American aid to Azerbaijan (with the exception of funds for disarmament programs) until its government takes real steps to end all blockades and use of force against the Armenian enclave in Nagorno-Karabakh. The foreign appropriations bill passed on October 24, 2001 gives the president the authority to waive any restrictions on aid to Azerbaijan if he determines it is in the national interest to do so. The Bush administration requested $50 million for Azerbaijan in FY2002 and $52.98 million in FY 2003, including $3 million in FMF, $750,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) and $46 million in FSA funding.
At the same time, the Bush administration began a reappraisal of the roles of the great powers in Central Asia, a process with significant implications for the region's geopolitics. U.S. assessments of Russia's role in Central Asia always depended on the level of cooperation in U.S.-Russia relations. During the Clinton administration, for example, the National Security strategy noted that the fate of Central Asia would depend on the prospects for reform in Russia.[21
] Reflecting the initial skepticism of the Bush administration about Russia, a U.S. official told Congress that Washington had an interest in preventing ties with Russia from complicating U.S. policy toward Central Asia and in cooperating where Moscow and Washington had common interests, for instance, in the United States-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan.[22
Since 9/11, U.S.-Russia cooperation has improved dramatically, facilitating the expanding U.S. security role in Central Asia. Despite Washington's wariness of China, China has proved a cooperative partner in persuading Pakistan to work closely with the United States in the anti-terrorism struggle, sharing intelligence and financial information about terrorist groups.
Moreover, even though in its first year in office the Bush administration displayed hostility to multilateralism, since 9/11 there has been a new awareness of the importance of regional and international organizations in integrating Central Asia within Western institutions and in facilitating regional anti-terrorism initiatives. Indeed, in the months since 9/11, the United States has sought to combat transnational threats such as terrorism by seeking to bring together states sharing U.S. values.[23
] Although the anti-terrorism coalition was formed to fight the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network, there is debate in the administration regarding the type of security architecture necessary to address future security needs.
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Jones noted that the countries of Central Asia "will play a critical role" in the campaign against terrorism, but will require the support of organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[24
On December 13-14, 2001, OSCE held an international conference in Bishkek on enhancing security and stability in Central Asia and strengthening efforts to counter terrorism. In particular, the conference focused on preventative measures, such as democratization, economic development, crime prevention, and border control. In his comments to the OSCE Permanent Council on December 20, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to OSCE Stephen Minikes noted the importance of creating the social, economic, and political conditions under which terrorism cannot thrive and called upon the OSCE to take concrete steps, such as denying terrorists access to funding and improving cooperation among law enforcement agencies.[25
U.S. Military Engagement in Central Asia
As policymakers have defined U.S. security interests in Central Asia, the United States military has taken a series of steps to engage Central Asia and enhance military-to-military cooperation. Reflecting the initial focus on Kazakhstan as the cornerstone of U.S. security in Central Asia, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a defense cooperation agreement in 1994, which was to involve dialogue on defense doctrine, training, and budgets. A subsequent agreement in 1997 expanded U.S. military cooperation with Kazakhstan to include nuclear security and defense conversion assistance. In recognition of Uzbekistan's increasing importance in regional counterterrorism efforts, similar agreements were signed with Uzbekistan, which, in 2000 also became the first recipient of a sizeable transfer of military equipment under the Foreign Military Financing program.[26
] It was not until 2001 that the United States began to appreciate the importance of stability in Tajikistan and the coalition government's vulnerability to Islamic militant groups. During a May 2001 visit to Dushanbe, General Tommy Franks, General Anthony Zinni's successor as head of Central Command (CENTCOM), called Tajikistan "a strategically important country" and promised security assistance. Tajikistan then committed to joining NATO's Partnership for Peace Program.[27
Expanding U.S. military engagement with Central Asian States has been viewed as a key mechanism to promote their integration into Western political-military institutions, encourage civilian control over militaries, and institutionalize cooperative relations with the United States military, while dissuading other regional powersespecially Russia, China, and Iranfrom seeking to dominate the region.[28
] Beginning in 1993, military officials from Central Asia began to receive training at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, as a part of a German-American security initiative.[29
] By mid-1994, all of the Central Asian states with the exception of Tajikistan, had joined NATO's PfP program. The program hosted a series of exercises to provide training in peacekeeping activities and develop interoperability. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan participated in Operation NUGGET exercises in peacekeeping tactics for land forces, which took place in August 1995 and in July 1997 at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the latter with Kazakhstan's participation. The three also took part in a multicountry amphibious exercise in North Carolina, along with the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and 16 other PfP members. In March 2001, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan joined the United States, five other NATO countries, and 13 PfP members in exercises in Nova Scotia.[30
In December 1995, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formed a joint peacekeeping unit, with the support of CENTCOM. The new unit, Centrazbat, was created to maintain stability in Central Asia and enable the three participating states to share information about tactics in support of their bid to join U.N. peacekeeping missions. Centrazbat exercises have been held annually, with the participation of the United States,[31
] other NATO members, and regional states, since 1997, with an alternating focus on field and command training.
On October 1, 1999, CENTCOM assumed responsibility for the five Central Asian states, which, as former Soviet republics, previously fell under the purview of the European Command. According to former CENTCOM Commander General Zinni, it was essential to integrate these states into CENTCOM's overall collective engagement strategy, based on the premise that "an ounce of proactive engagement protection is cheaper than a pound of war fighting cure."[32
Thus, the United States supported efforts such as Centrazbat to promote regional stability and deter efforts by extremists to create instability. Marine Corps Brigadier General Martin R. Berndt noted, not long after the formation of the joint battalion, that another rationale for U.S. participation in Centrazbat was to create working relationships between U.S. forces and Central Asian militaries prior to the eruption of a crisis requiring their joint efforts.[33
The 2001 exercise was held at a U.S. military base in Germany and focused on regional cooperation. Exercises were cancelled for 2002 due to ongoing cooperation with Central Asian militaries as a part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,but are likely to be continued in future years.[34
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for complete content of document, including:
- Foreward (by Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Director, Strategic Studies Institute)
- New Challenges and U.S. Military Responses
- Challenges for the U.S. Military
- Weak Regional Institutions
- Great Power Cooperation: Driving Forces and Fault-lines
- Deepening Domestic Instability in Central Asia
- Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
 Vernon Loeb, "Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia," The
, February 9, 2002, p. A9.
 . Edward Alden, "America Strives to Reshape Military Doctrine," Financial Times
, June 18, 2002, p. 2. For background see David E. Sanger, "Bush to Formalize a Defense Policy of Hitting First," The New York Times
, June 17, 2002, pp. A1, A6
 Critics claim that preemption should not give the U.S. carte blanche—Congress and allies should be consulted; a rationale for intervention must be presented; the threat must be identified precisely prior to any preemptive action; and there is no justification for first use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, should the U.S. adopt a preemptive doctrine, this may encourage others (for example, India and Pakistan) to act accordingly. See Editorial, "Striking First," The New York Times
, June 23, 2002, p. 12; Editorial, "The Dangers of Jumping the Gun," Financial Times
(London), June 18, 2002, p. 14. U.S. military doctrine already is being revised to allow for preemptive strikes against states threatening to use weapons of mass destruction. Walter Pincus, "U.S. Nuclear Arms Stance Modified by Policy Study," The Washington Post
, March 23, 2002, p. A14.
 Mike Allen and Karen DeYoung, "U.S. Will Strike First at Enemies; In West Point Speech, President Lays Out Broader U.S. Policy," The Washington Post
, June 2, 2002, p. A1.
 Jim Nichol, Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, May 18, 2001, p. 3
 Ibid., p.9.
 Ibid., p.8.
 Strobe Talbott, "The Great Game Is Over," Financial Times
, Sepember 1, 1997, p. 18.
 Ibid., p. 3.
 Ibid., p. 9.
 Frank T. Tsongos, "Central Asia: Official Outlines U.S. Policy
," RFE/RL, March 18, 1999
 A National Security Strategy for a New Century
, Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999, released, January 5, 2000.
 Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999
, 106th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1-5.
 U.S. Policy in Central Asia
, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, First Session, June 6, 2001, Serial No. 107-21, p. 10.
 Testimony by Clifford Bond, Acting Principal Deputy Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for NIS, in ibid., p. 7.
 A September 13, 2000, resolution by the House of Representatives, for example, noted Congressional concern about the pattern of human rights abuses in Central Asia and called upon these states to meet their OSCE obligations. Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, September 13, 2000. Available at: www.lexis-nexis.com
. Also U.S. Policy in Central Asia
, p. 6.
 "The State of the Union; Transcript of the President's Address," The Los Angeles Times
, Part A, Part I, p. 20.
 On September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted sanctions (required by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act) against both India and Pakistan. Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Dealings
, February 2002, Vol. 14, No.1, p. 4.
 A. Elizabeth Jones, "U.S.-Central Asian Cooperation," Testimony to the Subcomittee on Central Asia and the Caucasus, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, December 13, 2001, p. 9.
 Dangerous Dealings
, p. 5; Tarnoff, p. 8.
 A National Security Strategy for a New Century
 Also see U.S. Policy in Central Asia
, p. 8.
 Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff, "Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World
," The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY, April 22, 2002.
 Elizabeth Jones, "Anti-Terror Cooperation a New Foreign Policy Standard, Jones Says
," Speech to the German Studies Association annual conference, October 5, 2001.
 "U.S. Statement on Bishkek Conference on Terrorism
," December 20, 2001.
 Uzbekistan received 16 military transport vehicles. Turkemnistan and Kazakhstan later obtained coast guard vessels. Nichol, p. 8.
 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia
, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 111.
 Stephen J. Blank, U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia
, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2000, p.2.
 The Marshall Center also works closely with CENTCOM. Ron Martz, "War on Terrorism: U.S. Allies: Initiative Laid Foundation for Central Asian Cooperation," The Atlanta Constitution, January 12, 2002, p. 9A. Central Asian military personnel also attended U.S. military schools and received in-country training from Special Forces teams. C. J. Chivers, "A Nation Challenged: Special Forces: Long Before the War, Green Berets Built Military Ties to Uzbekistan," The New York Times
, October 25, 2001, p. A1.
 Kenley Butler, "U.S. Military Cooperation with the Central Asian States
," September 17, 2001, p. 2.
 The 82nd airborne division participated in 1997 and 2000 exercises in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, while the U.S. 10th Mountain Division joined a 1998 exercise in Uzbekistan. Butler, pp. 1-2.
 "Command in the News—U.S. Central Command
," February 1, 2002, p. 8.
 Butler, p. 2.
 Robert Karnio, "Anti-Terror Needs Cancel CENTRASBAT," January 23, 2002. Available at: www.janes.com.<<
Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick is an associate at the East Asian Institute at Columbia University. In 2002-03 she will be a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. She is the author of Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001) and of numerous articles on great power relations and regional development in Northeast Asia, published in Asian Survey, NBR Analysis, SAIS Review, Journal of East Asian Affairs, Issues and Studies, and Perspectives Chinoises, as well as in several edited volumes. She has taught at Barnard College, Columbia University and at Yale College, and has been a research fellow at Taiwan's Academia Sinica, the Hoover Institution, and the Davis Center at Harvard University. Dr. Wishnick's current research focuses on Sino-Russian relations, Chinese migration issues, Russia and inter-Korean relations, and the integration of the Russian Far East in Northeast Asia. She received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, an M.A. in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University, and a B.A. from Barnard College, and speaks both Russian and Chinese.
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to:Director, Strategic Studies InstituteU.S. Army War College122 Forbes Ave.Carlisle, PA 17013-5244
Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133, fax (717) 245-3820, or by contacting Ms. Rita Rummel at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil
Article copyright © Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick; Strategic Studies Institute; all rights reserved
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