ESTABLISHING A CINC FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
by Commander Michael Dobbs, U.S. Navy; Homeland Defense Journal
8:00 a.m. January 15, 2001 PDT
The question of who should guard the United States has become even more poignant after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, or the U.S. Navy.
The possibility of establishing a unified combatant command for homeland security 
has been raised several times in the past decade. This debate was sustained by the growing realization that the threat of asymmetric attacks against the United States was becoming more likely and that the military would be expected to make a significant contribution to protecting the homeland. The question of who should guard the United States has become even more poignant after the attacks on the World Trade Center and on the Pentagon. 
Many who studied this possibility had often assumed that an event similar to Pearl Harbor would have to occur in order to trigger a change of this magnitude in the Unified Command Plan. 
Although a catalyst for bold change entered the picture on 11 September 2001, it remains to be proven that a Commander-in-Chief (CINC) for homeland security would have avoided those attacks or that a CINC for homeland security is now required to mend the apparent gaps in America's security infrastructure. The purpose of this article will be to discuss the establishment of a CINC for homeland security.What CINCs Are and Do
The Unified Command Plan establishes nine unified combatant commands, led by Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), as America's "warrior chiefs." A unified combatant command "has broad,continuing missions and...is composed of forces from two or more military departments." 
Five of these commands are regional CINCs, responsible for being the primary military representative and conducting operations in their specified geographic area of responsibility. The remaining four commands are functional CINCs and conduct missions which are global in nature. Although U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is sometimes informally referred to as a "hybrid command," having both geographic responsibilities for the Atlantic and functional responsibilities (providing, training, and integrating its assigned joint forces), it is formally a geographic command. The commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is often referred to as a "CINC" and traditionally has had a seat at biannual CINCs' conferences. However, CINCNORAD is not a unified combatant commander as defined by U.S. Title 10. 
CINCs operate in a chain of command that runs to them from the President through the Secretary of Defense. CINCs are responsible for executing permanent missions (assigned through the Unified Command Plan) and non-permanent missions assigned by the President or by the Secretary of Defense with the approval of the President. 
CINCs are given broad authority to organize and give direction to their subordinate commands, employ their forces to carry out assigned missions, and coordinate and approve those aspects of administration, support, and discipline necessary to carry out assigned missions. 
In accordance with Goldwater-Nichols reforms, unified combatant commanders focus on military operations, while the Service Secretaries retain prerogatives regarding the personnel management, training, and equipping of their organization. U.S. Special Operations Command is an anomaly in that it functions as a quasi-Service, having both operational authority of assigned forces and responsibilities regarding the training, readiness, and equipping of all active and reserve special operations forces stationed in the United States. The History of the Homeland Security CINC Debate
The question of whether a CINC is required for defending the American homeland is not new. During the Cold War, U.S. Army Forces Command (USFORCCOM), with the authorities of a Specified Combatant Command, was largely responsible for continental defense against a Red Dawn 
scenario in which America found itself embroiled in World War III against the Soviet Union and was simultaneously fending off coordinated attacks on American soil. This mission slowly degraded in importance with the fall of the Soviet Union and as U.S. Army Forces Command ceased to be a specified command and was subsequently attached to U.S. Atlantic Command as its Army component command. 
U.S. Army Forces Command retains important responsibilities for the land defense of the 48 contiguous states. 
The 1997 National Defense Panel recommended that an “Americas Command” be established as a regional command, responsible for North and South America, as well as for homeland defense of the states on the North American continent. 
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century also studied organizational changes for homeland security and recommended that the Joint Task Force for Civil Support be reinforced and it assume some of the responsibilities performed by the Secretary of the Army and his action agent (the Director of Military Support) in the area of military assistance to civil authorities. None of the recent major public studies on homeland security (for example, those of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Defense Science Board) have recommended the establishment of a homeland security CINC. However, each study trumpeted the real and growing threat to the American homeland, and one (that of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century) even boldly predicted that Americans would likely die on American soil, possibly in great numbers, in the next 25 years. Although the absence of a recommendation for a homeland security CINC is not directly explained in the reports, it is probable that the authors did not believe that the military would or should have the prevalent role in protecting America from the shadowy threat of terrorism and therefore that major CINC reorganizations were not required.Current Distribution of Homeland Security Missions 
Defense of the homeland deserves the attention of a four-star CINC. In fact, it can be argued that homeland security missions are distributed to essentially all nine of the unified combatant commanders as well as NORAD. The matrix below illustrates roughly how homeland security responsibilities are assigned. 
The wide distribution of homeland security missions among the CINCs is mirrored by a similar degree of diffusion in the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To a certain extent, this distribution is due to the piecemeal approach used to assign the missions as they sequentially appeared on the national security horizon. However, the wide distribution, or specialization of effort, can also be attributed to the fact that the scope of homeland security missions is on the magnitude of, but smaller than, that of national security and that many homeland defense missions are conducted by regional CINCs who are the primary U.S. military authority in their area of responsibility. Assigning all of homeland security to just one CINC would be only slightly less difficult than asking only one CINC to execute America's National Military Strategy, as opposed to the nine that are organized to conduct regional and functional missions in support of national security.Does Establishing a New CINC for Homeland Security Make Sense?
At first glance, creating a new (10th) CINC focused on homeland security may appear to be a reasonable solution to a problem that has explosively evolved from something hypothetical into tragic reality, just as establishing U.S. Space Command seemed logical as the military importance of space became apparent. By establishing a homeland security CINC, one might hope to achieve unity of effort and synergy in this mission area. Additionally, a new CINC might facilitate coordination with the Inter-Agency and provide the NCA with "one stop shopping" for HLS issues. However, there are many sound reasons why the establishment of a new CINC is problematic.Establishment of any new CINC is a costly proposition.
Most CINC headquarters staffs, not including components, range from about 400 to over 1,000 military officers and enlisted personnel. Many CINCs also employ hundreds of contractors to round out their personnel rosters. In addition to a large requirement for junior, mid-grade, and senior officers, unified combatant commands employ several flag and general officers to lead "J-directorates" as well as to fill the CINC and deputy CINC positions. Although economy could perhaps be achieved by dual-hatting some of these flag and general officers, establishing a new CINC would probably entail creating several standalone billets. This would require shifting officers from other important assignments or, less likely, convincing Congress to lift mandatory caps on the number of flag and general officers. Increasing the number of joint billets also goes against the current desire (evidenced by the Quadrennial Defense Review and strategic reviews) that staffs be cut (as much as 15 percent or 20 percent) and not increased. Finally, establishing a new CINC also requires finding a location for, and constructing, the infrastructures required to house and support the CINC's staff.
It is also unclear if assigning all of the homeland security missions to one CINC would result in any synergy or improvement in mission effectiveness
. Every CINC is implicitly or explicitly assigned homeland security missions because the mission grouping is functionally so large and disparate, elements of it are performed in every geographic "CINCdom." The commonality between, for example, missile defense and counterdrug operations or between computer network defense and deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction is less than obvious. Additionally, the span-of-control associated with this mission cluster (especially if one accepts a homeland security strategic spectrum from attack prevention all the way to mitigation) would arguably exceed the efficient execution of one unified combatant command
. Finally, many of the homeland defense missions (for example, preemption, disruption, and threat reduction) are region-specific and fall within the purview of geographic CINCs. Consolidating the responsibilities for these missions in one CINC would require dramatic changes to U.S. Title 10 as well as to the Unified Command Plan.
Several existing units with homeland security responsibilities, many in the embryonic phase, would need to be transferred to the new homeland security command. A short list of candidate for transfer includes Joint Task Force–Civil Support, Joint Task Force–Computer Network Operations, Response Task Forces East and West, and the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force, as well as large land, naval, and air forces. These transfers would be disruptive to the development of some of these units (especially the Joint Task Force–Civil Support and Joint Task Force–Computer Network Operations) as well as to the CINCs from whom the units were taken.
It is also unlikely that the establishment of a HLS would rapidly improve the military's support to protecting the Homeland. As the history of the Unified Command Plan demonstrates, the new homeland security CINC's headquarters would require years in order to stand up and develop the corporate knowledge and ties required to execute its responsibilities
. During this transition period, it is probable that the ability of the Defense Department to contribute to homeland security would actually degrade.
To summarize, a large CINC for the entire spectrum of homeland security tasks and based in the United States would not necessarily improve America's ability to deal with 21st-century asymmetric threats. What is needed to prevent, protect, and mitigate the terrorist attacks, once comprehensive national counterterrorism is established by the Executive Office of the President, is closer cooperation and clearer lines of responsibility and authority between the Defense Department and the lead federal agencies in charge of functions such as counterterrorism (Department of Justice / Federal Bureau of Investigation), manmade disasters (the Federal Emergency Management Agency), airport security, and control of entry points into the United States. In short, the focus should be on providing more effective and responsive military civil support in the United States
while allowing functional CINCs (that is, Strategic Command and Special Operations Command) and the regional CINCs to deter attacks and provide an appropriate U.S. response overseas where the threat is based.Could an Existing Command Take Over Homeland Security?
Assuming that more of the responsibility and authority for protecting the homeland should be centralized into one military organization, there are a variety of pre-existing candidates who might take on the mantle of "Homeland Security CINC." 
As recently stated by Senator John Warner, any discussion of a new HLS CINC should be concurrent with looking at the range of existing organizations to see "whether one of them can be tasked with this as an additional responsibility." Perhaps the three best candidates are NORAD, JFCOM, and Special Operations Command. NORAD is a bi-national command responsible for aerospace warning, defense, and control for Canada and the states on the North American continent. NORAD has been the "foundation of Canadian-U.S. defense cooperation since 1958" 
and has, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) served both important military and symbolic roles. However, the reduction in ballistic missiles and long-range bombers since the end of the Cold War has raised questions regarding NORAD's relevancy in the 21st century. The fact that the terrorist attack was executed from the air naturally leads to considering this aerospace defense command for the Defense Department lead in homeland security.
The NORAD agreement was renewed for five more years in May 2001. The scope of NORAD's mission has remained essentially the same and focuses on aerospace warning and control. NORAD possesses a wealth of organizational and military experience and a robust infrastructure for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence that could serve as the foundation for additional missions in homeland security.
However, many factors argue against building a "homeland security CINC" on the NORAD foundation.
To begin with, NORAD is a bi-national command. This fact poses a variety of problems. Since NORAD's charter is a bi-national agreement (signed by each nation's foreign minister), adaptation to the rapidly changing and politically sensitive homeland security environment could be sluggish.
This problem is exemplified by the reluctance of Canada to take a firm position on North American missile defense despite the fact that missile defense would seem close to the core of NORAD's mission and tradition of aerospace defense. Agreement on such culturally and politically complex issues as counter-drug operations and civil disturbances would be hard, if not impossible, to obtain. Finally, although the bi-national nature of NORAD does not necessarily imply a national veto on operations, it is quite conceivable that unity of effort and efficient mission execution could be compromised by squabbles associated with highly nuanced and politically charged missions such as immigration control in the event of a mass migration incident emanating from South or Central America or the Caribbean.
An issue also arises regarding the NORAD commander who has traditionally been dual-hatted as CINC Space Command. Although formed in the 1980s, U.S. Space Command has become a "growth CINC." During the past three Unified Command Plan cycles, U.S. Space Command has been tasked with new missions in space and cyberspace, two war-fighting mediums the importance of which was predicted by the U.S. Space Commission 
and others, to grow greatly over the next few decades. Although NORAD's and U.S. Space Command's staffs are largely separate, shifting all homeland security missions to CINC Space Command/CINCNORAD could result in an excessive span-of-control
for the command's senior leadership, especially in time of crisis and conflict.
To take on additional responsibilities for land and maritime defense, NORAD (actually the U.S. Element of NORAD) would also have to be assigned significant naval and ground forces based in the 48 contiguous states. Most of these forces are assigned to JFCOM, which has control of more than three-fourths of the general-purpose forces located in the 48 contiguous states. Such a transfer would counter the logic that established JFCOM in 1999 as the joint force provider, trainer, and integrator with the lead for transforming the U.S. military for the 21st century. As a command largely dominated, for good historical reasons, by air warriors, it would also be difficult for NORAD to quickly absorb and integrate a large influx of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces to execute homeland security, which is clearly a grouping of joint missions.
Finally, the geographic location of the NORAD–Space Command complex is less than ideal
. Located in Colorado, the headquarters is far removed from America's political leadership as well as from the interagency players with whom a homeland security CINC would have to coordinate closely. Although NORAD has robust communications capabilities, this would not be a substitute for face-to-face interactions. If established as the homeland security CINC, NORAD's leadership and its staff would spend an inordinate amount of time shuttling between the Rocky Mountains and the East Coast to attend conferences and meetings.
Another candidate to assume the mantle of homeland security CINC is U.S. JFCOM, which already has control of most forces based in the 48 contiguous states and has these states "virtually" assigned to it as an area of responsibility. As shown in Figure 1, JFCOM is, and has been for quite some time, responsible for many civil support missions, including assisting civil authorities to mitigate the consequences of natural and manmade disasters (such as terrorist attack) and supporting law enforcement agencies in areas such as civil disturbances, counter-drug operations, and immigration control. 
Since 1999, Joint Task Force–Civil Support has served as a deployable command and control headquarters to coordinate and direct the Defense Department's on-scene support in domestic emergencies as well as serving as a "think tank" to help develop and standardize the equipment, doctrine, and training required to provide an effective joint and interagency response to these emergencies. Even before the Joint Task Force–Civil Support was established, U.S. Army Forces Command had established two Response Task Forces for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The bulk of the forces employed to respond to domestic emergencies would come from U.S. Army Forces Command (JFCOM's Army component), but could also be drawn from the other large JFCOM components, such as Air Combat Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Marine Forces, Atlantic.
In addition to already having a large equity in, and experience conducting, civil support missions, JFCOM also is assigned important homeland defense missions
. JFCOM, and the series of commands that preceded it, is responsible for planning the defense of Canada and the 48 contiguous states as well as for countering threats from the eastern maritime approaches to America. If eventually assigned maritime (3rd Fleet) and Marine Corps forces (the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force) on the West Coast, an option debated for several years, U.S. JFCOM would then be capable of performing the same function for the Pacific approaches to the homeland.
Although JFCOM is not located in the national capital region, the CINCJFCOM is much closer to Washington than CINCNORAD/CINC Space Command
. Based in Norfolk, the CINC and his staff are a quick helicopter flight away from Washington and shuttle services between the two decision-making hubs are well established. The JFCOM HQ is also located close to Joint Task Force–Civil Support as well as the CINC's Navy and Marine Corps component headquarters.
Finally, JFCOM is responsible for transforming the military for the future security environment. Through joint experimentation and interoperability, JFCOM is already helping develop doctrine and equipment that will contribute to war against terrorism, providing, for example, the ability to quickly and accurately detect, target, and destroy mobile targets. If the military requires a major transformation to deal with asymmetric threats, JFCOM is well equipped to lead this effort.
However, there are reasons to hesitate before assigning U.S. JFCOM this mission area, the importance and complexity of which are likely to continue expanding. JFCOM was established from the U.S. Atlantic Command in order to focus on transforming the U.S. joint forces through experimentation, improved interoperability, and training. These functional missions must already compete for resources and the leadership's attention with its residual responsibilities for the Atlantic area of responsibility and the CINC's NATO role as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Giving CINCJFCOM the entire homeland security basket might result in an excessive span of control as well as degrade his ability to take the U.S. military to the next level of "jointness."
Another possibility would be to assign the homeland security portfolio to U.S. Special Operations Command, which arguably has specialized training, equipment, personnel, and experience that could be useful in dealing with the broad spectrum of terrorist threats. Additionally, Special Operations Command has a culture and operational history conducive to operating in the ambiguous battlefield where the U.S. confronts terrorism
. However, although it is a joint organization, it might, like NORAD, have difficulty absorbing additional general-purpose forces required to provide the manpower to deal with other domestic emergencies and conventional threats from the sea and land. This metamorphosis would also dilute Special Operations Command's focus that was established by Congress in U.S. Title 10. Assigning the homeland security mission area, and perhaps the 48 contiguous states, to Special Operations Command might also be problematic, considering the sensitivities associated with many of the homeland security missions and could increase public opposition to raising the visibility of the military's contribution to protecting the homeland.Conclusions and Recommendations
The September 2001 terrorist attack against the American homeland demands an immediate response as well as fundamental changes to how the United States is organized and equipped to meet its Constitutional responsibility to protect Americans. The unified combatant commanders will need to shift more of their planning, day-to-day focus, and capabilities toward performing homeland security missions. However, establishing a new CINC in charge of all homeland security missions would probably be prohibitively expensive, would take several years to implement, and might result in an unmanageable span-of-control to execute such a large grouping of missions, some of which have very little in common. Just as it would be next to impossible to have just one CINC for national security, the broad scope of homeland security argues against putting one CINC in charge despite the desire for having just one person responsible when an incident occurs.
A better solution would be to assign increased responsibilities for homeland security missions to a pre-existing CINC. Although NORAD has served its Cold War mission well and continues to provide a valuable contribution to North American security, its bi-national nature, remote location, and narrow focus on only one homeland security mission makes it a poor candidate to quickly assume the lead for the military's contribution to defending the homeland. Although the most recent and dramatic attack came from the air, the next terrorist assault may just as likely be delivered by boat, a truck crossing our borders, or through cyberspace
. A much better candidate would be JFCOM, which already has the lead for providing military assistance to civil authorities in the 48 contiguous states and several homeland defense missions. To effect this change, the following steps should be considered:
- Expand Joint Task Force–Civil Support into a sub-unified command (commanded by a four-star General and located in the National Capital Region) for civil support (assigned to U.S. JFCOM) to include several response task forces for domestic emergencies and one or more joint interagency task forces to coordinate counterdrug, border and port control, counterterrorism, and other law enforcement assistance to civil authorities. These regional joint interagency task forces would include personnel from the Coast Guard, the Departments of Commerce, Transportation, and Justice (for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service), special forces, and the U.S. Intelligence Community. It would also be appropriate to assign the WMD-CSTs and other Reserve Component forces to this command. Should it eventually prove desirable, the civil support subunified command could be the core around which a new homeland security CINC is created.
- Task CINCJFCOM to be the military lead for influencing the nation's homeland security strategy and coordinating its execution by the U.S. military.
- Assign the states on the North American continent, plus the Pacific Ocean out as far as 200 nautical miles.  Consider also assigning Mexico and Canada to JFCOM as soon as politically feasible and transfer the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean back to JFCOM from SOUTHCOM.
- Reinforce JFCOM's command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities and construct a command center similar to, and interoperable with, the Space Command/NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Operational Center as a backup for the current aerospace defense mission and in anticipation of a national or North American missile defense system.
- Establish a sub-unified command for transformation (joint experimentation and interoperability) to be commanded by a three or four star officer under USJFCOM.
- Establish a large liaison cell in Washington to improve coordination between JFCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and members of the interagency task forces.
- Transfer CINCJFCOM's hat as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and perhaps a portion of the Atlantic area of responsibility, to either CINC European Command or CINC Southern Command to allow JFCOM to focus on homeland security and its functional responsibilities for joint force training, integrating, and providing.
- Retain the current distribution of homeland defense missions (deterrence, preemption and disruption, aerospace defense, and land and maritime defense) as is and fund the capabilities required for the regional and functional CINCs to execute these missions more efficiently and precisely.
- Allow JTF-Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) to remain and mature at SPACECOM. Although protection of the National Information Infrastructure will become increasingly important to America's economic security, legal and cultural realities dictate that non-DoD federal agencies in partnership with business leaders must spearhead this battle. JTF-CNO should remain focused on protection the Defense Information Infrastructure and providing CINCs and the NCA computer network attack (CNA) tools to supplement other weapons of war. As recently stated by Frank Cillufo of CSIS regarding national cyber security, "This is an issue of marrying up efforts of the government and private sector.," said Cilluffo. "Implementation and execution is not going to be Uncle Sam." 
As many have recently pointed out, the American homeland cannot be secured by the military acting alone. However, it appears appropriate to designate a CINC as the military lead for homeland security, with a special focus on improving the many forms of assistance that the military can provide to civilian law enforcement and other Federal agencies. US Joint Forces Command is the best candidate to expand its current homeland security roles and quickly and efficiently assume this designation. Although the temptation will be great to find a quick-reaction solution to the homeland security challenge by establishing a new "CINCHOMELAND," it may be more advantageous to wait until the lessons learned from America's first "war on terrorism" are available to decide how the unified combatant commands should be reorganized to protect the homeland from this new and merciless form of conflict.
 Homeland security could be defined as the prevention of, and protection against, attacks directed at U.S. territory, domestic populations, and American infrastructure, as well as the response required to mitigate such attacks.
 “Military Is Embroiled in Debate Over Who Should Guard the United States,” Inside the Pentagon, 20 September 2001, p. 1.
 The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions and geographic areas of responsibilities of the unified combatant commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to periodically, not less frequently than every two years, review the Unified Command Plan and present to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, recommended changes. The current version of the Unified Command Plan was approved by President Clinton in September 1999.
 U.S. Title 10, Section 161(c).
 CINC Atlantic Fleet and CINC Pacific Fleet also are “CINCs” but do not exercise Title 10 CINC authorities.
 U.S. Title 10, Section 164(b).
 U.S. Title 10, Section 164(c).
 U.S. title 10, Section 167.
 Red Dawn (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studies, Inc., 1984).
 Many unified commands are assigned combatant command components that are composed of one service. For example, Air Combat Command is the Air Force component to U.S. Joint Forces Command, just as the Military Sealift Command is the naval component to U.S. Transportation Command. See the Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, 2000 for a listing of the component command, joint task forces, and sub-unified commands assigned to the CINCs.
 A Brief History of FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command], 12 September 2001).
 See Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century—Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997.
 For the purpose of this article, military missions in support of homeland security are placed into two functional groups: homeland defense and civil support. Homeland defense missions are fairly traditional missions in which the Defense Department normally has the lead. Civil support missions are functions in which the Defense Department provides assistance to federal agencies and in which law and American political culture have determined that the military should not be the lead but should operate under the firm supervision and control of a civil agency.
 Explanatory: MSCA = military support to civil authorities (natural and manmade disasters); MACDIS = military assistance for civil disturbances (riots); WMD = weapons of mass destruction, often referred to as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive; CANUS = Canada–United States; CONUS = the "continental" United States, defined as U.S. territory between Canada and Mexico.
 William McMichael, Establishing a Homeland Defense, Navy Times, 8 October 2001.
 Canada and U.S. Extend NORAD Agreement, North American Aerospace Defense Command news release, 21 June 2000.
 See the Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security: Space Management and Organization, 11 January 2001.
 U.S. Joint Forces Command website.
 Assigning CONUS to a CINC's AOR may be problematic and possibly unnecessary since most of the tasks that regional CINCs perform for the nations in their AORs (e.g. theater engagement, managing military assistance programs, etc) are not applicable to the U.S. A better solution may simply be to assign USJFCOM with additional responsibilities (such as force protection and counter-terrorism) within CONUS.
 Dan Verton, Bush Taps Clarke as Cyberdefense Chief, ComputerWorld, October, 2 2001.
Commander Michael Dobbs is a policy planner for the U.S. Navy and has served on the Joint Staff in J-5, Strategic Plans. He is a submarine officer and has served on both attack and ballistic missile submarines. Commander Dobbs completed a master's degree in Political Science/International Relations as an Olmsted Scholar at the Grenoble Institute of Political Studies (France) and holds an MPA from Troy State University. He has earned two diplomas from the U.S. Naval War College, including one in International Law.
Article copyright © Michael Dobbs; Homeland Defense Journal; all rights reserved
| r e a d i n g |
Combating Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism: A Comprehensive Strategy (A Report of the Csis Homeland Defense Project); Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash, Gordon Nathaniel Lederman; ISBN: 0892063890
Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending the U.S. Homeland; Anthony H. Cordesman; ISBN: 0275974278
How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War; Gideon Rose, James F. Hoge Jr.; ISBN: 1586481304
The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11; Strobe Talbot, Nayan Chanda ; ISBN: 0465083560
Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending the U.S. Homeland; Anthony H. Cordesman; ISBN: 0275974278
Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare; Bard E. O'Neill, Edward C. Meyer; ISBN: 1574883356
What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response; Bernard Lewis; ISBN: 0195144201
Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox; Jonathan B. Tucker; ISBN: 0871138301
The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction; Nadine Gurr, Benjamin Cole; ISBN: 1860644600
Holy War, Inc.: Inside The Secret World of Osama Bin Laden; Peter L. Bergen; ISBN: 0743205022
From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine; Joan Peters; ISBN: 0963624202
Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Comparative Studies in Religion and Society); Mark Juergensmeyer; ISBN: 0520223012
Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy; Richard Haass, Council on Foreign Relations; ISBN: 0876092121
Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy; Paul R. Pillar, Michael H. Armacost; ISBN: 0815700040
Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare;Bard E. O'Neill, Edward C. Meyer; ISBN: 1574883356
The Ultimate Terrorists; Jessica Stern; ISBN: 0674617908
The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism; Simon Reeve; ISBN: 1555534074
| u s e n e tg r o u p s |
| w e b s i t e s |
National Security Agency
Office of Homeland Security (White House)
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security (US Gov)
Defense Technical Information Center (US Dept of Defense)
DefenseLINK (Official Website of the US Dept of Defense)
GAO Reports: Homeland Security (US General Accounting Office)
US Immigration & Naturalization Service (USINS INS)
Jane's Information Group
Jane's Regional Security Digest
Homeland Defense Journal
Homeland Security and Defense (Business Week publication)
Center for Security Policy
ANSER Institute for Homeland Security
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Center For Strategic & International Studies
Regional Centre for Strategic Studies
Adm. Blair on Regional Security, Fight Against Terrorism (US Dept of State)
The Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective... (US Army War College)
(*see our resource directory for add'l resources)